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Summary 
In the pursuit of understanding the behavior of the market player, the basic argument relays on the supposition 
that the risk appetite increases exactly at the worst moment - when the capacity to assume additional risk decreases 
significantly.People view a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative and cvasi similar to the 
population in all its essential characteristics. They expect any two samples drawn from a particular population to be 
more similar to one another and to the population than is statistically justifiable. This behavior is different from the 
tenets of classic finance theory. 
  The paper aims at demonstating that investor psychological biases lead to investment performance to tilt to 
the  mean  in  the  long  run  and  by  following  the  trend,  the  financial  market  population  do  not  enjoy  significant 
sustainable benefits.  As a reflection of the behavioral biases and influences, the statistical demonstration supports the 
conclusion that markets do not random walk.   
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1.  The Introduction and the Study Context 
 
In  a  seminal  Harvard  Business  Review  article1  co-authored  by  psychologist  and  Nobel  laureate  Daniel 
Kahneman gives a checklist approach to decision making at an institutional level to avoid biases. According to the 
article, the potential for distortions are so high that knowing biases were not enough to eliminate these. The authors 
illustrate the reflective and intuitive thinking process. In intuitive thinking, we don’t focus on doing things, we just do 
them. Intuitive is good at making contextual stories. This is when cognitive failures happen, as there is no way of 
knowing when they are happening. According to the authors, talking doesn’t eliminate biases. A more methodical 
approach is needed. A study observed that eliminating biases achieved 7 % points’ higher returns. Kahneman and team 
suggest  eliminating  biases  can  improve  decision  making  profitably.  So,  if  the  method  works  for  businesses,  the 
approach should also work for investors and markets, and could be an improvement on the three-year reversal cycles of 
behavioral finance where worst stocks outperform the best. We reviewed Kahneman’s checklist for decision makers to 
see if the approach also assists an investor. Is there any reason to suspect motivated errors (or errors driven by the self-
interest of recommending team)? Now, this could be a good business checklist but the markets are known to have a 
manipulation element, the zero-sum game instruments, your loss is my gain. Above that, we are living at a time of 
educating society about ethics and conflict of interest. Markets are full of motivated errors. 
  Have the people making the recommendation fallen in love with it? From a market perspective, advisory 
services are ranked based on their recommendations. And, few take a detour on a previous forecast. So, market analysts 
can be assumed to be mostly in love with their forecasts.  
 
 
What if there are dissenting  opinions  within the recommending team? Though there are always dissenting 
opinions among market advisories, there is always a clear skew either on the buy or on the sell side. More often on buy 
than on sell. Hence, dissenting views are not polarized enough in markets. A question that decision makers should ask 
the team making recommendations - could the diagnosis of the situation is overly influenced by salient analogies? 
                                                 
1 Daniel Kahneman, Dan Lovallo, and Olivier Sibony, The Big Idea: Before You Make That Big Decision...,Harvard 
Business Review, June 2011 
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Trading volume and new highs are known to have an undue influence on investors. Other questions include: Can 
investor see the halo effect? Do you know where the numbers came from? If you had to make the decision again in a 
year, what information would you want?  
Are people making the recommendation overly attached to past decisions? Investors generally buy companies 
with an aura. Investors don’t just buy numbers, as there are many variables in markets. Hence, stories are bought or 
sold,  not  numbers.  Few  investors  learn  from  mistakes,  as  there  is  less  annual  review.  If  80  %  of  investing  is 
momentum, the past trend exerts an excessive influence on investors.   
 
2.  The Reversion to the Mean theory 
 
  The  mean  reversion  theory  suggests  that  prices  and  returns  eventually  move  back  towards  the  mean  or 
average. This mean or average can be the historical average of the price or return or another relevant average such as 
the growth in the economy or the average return of an industry. This theory has led to many investing strategies 
involving the purchase or sale of stocks or other securities whose recent performance has greatly differed from their 
historical averages. However, a change in returns could be a sign that the company no longer has the same prospects it 
once did, in which case it is less likely that mean reversion will occur. Percent returns and prices are not the only 
measures seen as mean reverting; interest rates or even the price-earnings ratio of a company can be subject to this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1: how markets pressure to mean reversion 
 
 
Ideal  mean  reversion  in  illustration  ’a’  is  how  markets  should  express  mean  reversion.  The  overbought 
(overvalued should push back to an absolute mean and vice versa). Where θ is the rate of reversion to the mean, μ is the 
mean value of the process, σ is the variance of the process and Wt is a Wiener Process or Brownian Motion. In a 
discrete setting the equation states that the change of the price series in the next time period is proportional to the 
difference between the mean price and the current price, with the addition of Gaussian noise.  
  One critical assumption is to consider the return distribution as normal or lognormal. In a normal distribution, 
return distribution intervals have a constant measure, in a lognormal distribution, the intervals value depends on the 
relative value of stock price. If stock price variations are independent, the return distribution is normal, and if log 
differences are independent and have a finite variance, the price distribution is lognormal. An efficient, fair market 
should preclude any investor to infer immediate evolution based on past evolution.
2  
     
                                                 
2 Bodie, Zvi; Alex Kane; Alan J. Marcus.(1989); Investments, Irwin; p 342 
a 
b 
c 
d 
However  many  times  after  falling  below 
mean markets don’t revert back to the absolute mean 
(illustration b).  
 
While  sometimes  after  getting  oversold 
(overvalued) and staying above the mean attempting 
to get back to mean value, markets or asset prices 
stay  overbought  and  get  more  overbought 
(overvalued) (illustration c).  
 
Sometimes there is a clear disregard to mean 
value,  markets  ignore  the  mean  totally  (see 
illustration d).  
 
A continuous mean-reverting time series can 
be represented by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic 
differential equation dxt=θ(μ−xt)dt+σdWt 
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Figures 2: normal vs. log normal distribution 
                                                   
Normal distribution                                                     Lognormal distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: how investors love to interpret three points as a straight line, a trend 
     
Human brain has a limited capacity to process, assimilate and understand the huge volume of   information 
and  stimuli  that  assault  us  every  second.  The  decisions  and  judgments  investors  undertake  daily  (hundreds)  are 
constrained by personal circumstances, time pressure, psychological and emotional factors, and are at the crossfire of a 
rational and non-rational influences. People often ignore a good decision for the simple fact that they are, in general, 
more interested by simple, reasonable and feasible   solutions to their investment dilemmas.  
The perception, especially when it comes to money, are distorted and biased by investment performance history, 
present circumstances and future expectations. Attitudes and decisions in the   financial area are a cocktail of rational 
and non-rational motives. Investors reach a certain conclusion and   implement  the  subsequent  decision  based  on 
what they know at the moment, anchoring themselves in information considered relevant, losing the larger perspective. 
Financial decisions are sometimes  suboptimal  due  to  simplistic,  heuristic  and  emotional  logic.  Through  the  basic 
feature  of  human  nature  of  search  for  enjoyment,  investors  are  attracted  by  interesting,  colored  and  attractive 
information that  conforms to their hard-embedded beliefs and creeds.  
  The investors are short sighted, but most of the value comes from long term investing. The Behavioral biases 
drives markets booms and busts but bring some fun to life. One logical question debated in the manual is whether a 
behavioral managed portfolio can outperform, on a risk adjusted basis an actively managed investment. A behavioral 
approach would mean trading against the cycle of   emotions,  buying  when  others  are  panicked  and  selling  when 
others are enjoying their new found fortunes. This tactic, however, does not answer to the most critical answers, how 
much, when, what if initially market short term trend proves you wrong? Why are these questions important? Because 
even an agile investor smartly decides to buy when the market falls abruptly, probably she will buy only a small 
amount, since it is so emotionally difficult to overcome fear of an extended correction.    
  Investors either buy too little (too soon) or sell too little (too late), so a strong behavioral based strategy can 
prove to be insufficient for the overall portfolio performance. Administration of investors’ emotions is not simply 
equivalent with market timing. Proper selection without sufficient allocation does not improve long term investment 
performance, on a risk – adjusted basis.  
  Volatility is a key stress element for the investor. Risk is not equivalent to volatility but a permanent loss of 
capital, not a random price fluctuation. Romanian market volatility is high during recessionary time and will remain 
high during recovery times, and cheap stocks can become cheaper and expensive assets can become more expensive.  
   
 
 
 
 
By design, when markets go up, most of 
the investors do better than when markets go 
down. 
Probably  it  is  much  better  to  try  to 
understand  where  the  market  is  going,  when  is 
going to start in that direction, and how much of 
your money will you be able to bet on that.  
 
   Understand where the market is going, 
when is going to start in that direction, and how 
much of your money will you be able to bet on 
that.  
Human  mind  searches  patterns.  In  our 
instant imagination, three is a trend 
Human mind searches patterns. 
Three is a trend 
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Central Banks rates FED, BCE and BNR 
Resuming consumption and investment lending in sustainable conditions is still 
far away, while taking into consideration the prolonging and intensification of 
cross-border financial deleveraging, monetary accommodation competition 
between the large central banks. The context is critical in any financial and 
investment decision. 
 
Robert Shiller’s’ Paper on ‘The Volatility of Stock markets Prices’ published in 1987 uses dividend data and 
real interest rates to seek evidence that true investment value changes through time sufficiently to justify the price 
changes.  His  paper  concluded  that  most  of  the  volatility  of  the  stock  market  prices  appears  unexplained.  Shiller 
volatility or fluctuations prove that behavior of markets is not normal. Non normal distribution series is a widely 
followed proof of inefficiency in prices. 
 
 
Graph 1: Robert Shiller’s’ Paper on ‘The Volatility of Stock markets Prices’ 
 
 
 
 
Graph2: Silent competition among Central Banks. different agendas, sometimes colluding sometimes colliding interests  
 
   
  Fortunately, over optimism is a basic tenet of human species. In general, people do not spend too much time 
on looking and understanding the bad news. Investors would rather prefer to focus on the bright side of the moon an, 
most of the time, they do not see things that they do not expect to see. What you see is what you look for.  
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Positive thinking and planning (a to do-list, applicable when facing the unexpected black swan) can bring a 
sense of control and a release of anxiety and stress in the heat of the moment when the investor loses money so hard 
earned, and evidently she cannot think clearly and long term. By discipline and clear thinking, the investor can learn 
from past mistakes and rather than worry on things that she cannot control, should focus on how to position her existing 
portfolio to the eventual market rebound, by discipline, innovation and planning.  
As recent market gyrations inefficient and aggressive rebalancing of the portfolio, especially on a downward 
trend,  is  highly  detrimental  to  the  overall  active  performance  of  the  portfolio.  By  fear  of  losing  opportunity  for 
additional profit, investors that are not keeping their temper, act impulsively by extrapolation of short-term trend into a 
medium and long-term investment attraction. As consequence of their actions, their risk profile is changed and the 
investors appear to be able to bear more risk that would be otherwise reasonable, advisable and economic rational. An 
investor analyzing the table below probably would be interested in the Romanian market: 
 
  
 
Table1: 2014, Over recession but prolonged crisis:  
Equity Risk, Credit premiums 
 
 
  
  
Real GDP 
Growth 
Real 
Earnings 
Growth  + 
Dividend 
Yield  = 
 
Expect
Real 
Return  - 
Real 
Bond 
Yield  =  
 
Impli
ed 
ERP 
Expected 
Inflation 
Expect. 
Nominal 
Return 
US  3.0  3.0 
 
1.8 
 
4.8     1.5 
 
3.3  2.0  6.8 
Japan  1.5  1.5 
 
1.7 
 
3.2     0.8 
 
2.4  0.5  3.7 
UK  2.8  2.8 
 
3.2 
 
6.0     -1.0 
 
7.0  2.0  8.0 
Roman
ia  1  2     2     4.0     2.5     1.5  2.5  4 
   +2.5  3,5     3,5     7     3     4  2,75  6,75 
   +5  4     4,5     8,5     2     6,5  5.0  11,5 
EU   0.3  2.3 
 
2.9 
 
5.2     -1.0 
 
6.1  2.0  7.2 
World  2.5  2.5     2.3     4.8     0.4     4.4  1.8  6.6 
 
  However, the absolute performance is less relevant than the relative return that investor assigns n her value 
judgment. The stock market mechanism evaluates and rewards economic performance objectively, transparently and 
instantly: on such alert and competitive market, if investor loses 4% when the relevant benchmark is down 6%, she is 
well regarded; however, gaining only 4% when the index rose 6% in a specific period is considered poor investment 
performance.  
  Professional  survivorship  depends  essentially  on  how  adaptive  is  the  investment  behavior  relative  to  the 
attitude  of  other  market  participants.  The  tension  between  uthenticity  and  adaptation  generates  the  professional 
competition that makes a market winner. One way to cope with the inherent professional stress of money management 
business is to adapt and conform to the governing rules of the group investor belongs to and to which she is compared 
in real time; contrarians decisions that resulted in negative results are penalized much more severely that are rewarded 
those with positive results.    
  If markets should follow a Random Walk, that feature would be a strong argument against behavioral finance 
– that predicts that due to investor biases and emotions, market moves are forming patterns that can be profitable to 
exploit.  After Louis Bachelier – the inventor of the concept of Random Walk or Fair Game (expected return for a 
speculator is zero), his outstanding research follower Eugen Fama won a Noble Prize in Economics Science in 2013. 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/fam-facts.html) 
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For a comprehensive/composite, BET C:  
BETC
3Index 
Regression:  t t t I I        ) ln( ) ln( 1  
Dependent Variable: L_BETC     
Method: Least Squares     
Sample (adjusted): 2 2721     
Included observations: 2720 after adjustments 
 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  0.001408  0.002354  0.598049  0.5499 
L_BETC(-1)  0.999828  0.000319  3135.660  0.0000 
         
          R-squared  0.999724     Mean dependent var  7.318815 
Adjusted R-squared  0.999724     S.D. dependent var  0.958268 
S.E. of regression  0.015933     Akaike info criterion  -5.440090 
Sum squared resid  0.690009     Schwarz criterion  -5.435746 
Log likelihood  7400.523     F-statistic  9832362. 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.661549     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
         
           
Regression  1 1 0    t t      
Dependent Variable: RESID_BETC   
Method: Least Squares     
 
Sample (adjusted): 3 2721; Included observations: 2719 
after adjustments     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  -6.30E-06  0.000301  -0.020929  0.9833 
RESID_BETC(-1)  0.168923  0.018905  8.935166  0.0000 
         
          R-squared  0.028546     Mean dependent var  -6.91E-06 
Adjusted R-squared  0.028188     S.D. dependent var  0.015929 
S.E. of regression  0.015703     Akaike info criterion  -5.469195 
Sum squared resid  0.669969     Schwarz criterion  -5.464850 
Log likelihood  7437.371     F-statistic  79.83719 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.009356     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
         
  According to the regression equation that was tested, the  1  coefficient is statistically significant. We can infer 
that there is liniar dependence between daily returns, and the index series of BETC does not follow a random walk 
pattern. Other factors could influence this evolution, and they are persistent and consistent. Further, is the base case too 
optimistic? Is the recommending team overly cautious? Is the worst case bad enough? This depends on the investment 
style. A contrarian approach is counter intuitive. A contrarian never works with an optimistic base case. When he 
invests or recommends, s/he suggests taking risk, not be cautious. A contrarian looks at the worst case. The checklist 
again proves momentum investing is full of biases and hence poor decision making. And, the only way to control our 
own intuition could be to embrace the objective contrarian approach. Buy the worst and sell the best.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 BETC index public data: Apr. 1998 – Ian. 2012 
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3.   Conclusions 
 
People tend to discount the eventual implications of low probability- high negative impact events, but these 
events, due to their apparent low probability, seem to happen less often than anticipated. The most expected outcome of 
these possible yet less probable events can have, however, disastrous effects on the prospect value of investor portfolio. 
High emotional impact events, although rare, have a major, indelible impact on the emotional registry of a person. Any 
subsequent decision is affected by historical record of successes and failures. In general, investor that succeeds and 
survives on the long term, makes small gains systematically (or wins more and more times than they lose). Their 
investment success is not a simple luck of result of a continuous stream of rational and correct material decisions but of 
a disciplined and focused approach, prime access to information and ability to assemble on time and correctly the 
available data, coupled with the ability for innovation and adaptation to the continuous change and challenge of the 
market game. Investment managers have to prove their repeatable professional ability and sustainable value-adding 
capability  on  a  continuous  basis  to  their  employers,  employees,  and  investment  public.  Although  the  business  of 
managing  investment  assets  is  much  more  complicated,  competitive,  rewarding  and  challenging  than  ever,  and 
investors are increasingly sophisticated, their emotional attributes remain as simple as always - fear of losses and desire 
to make money. Mental cognitive errors are frequently caused by heuristic simplifications - logical shortcuts by which 
decision makers use simple rules to solve complex problems.  When this approach is used inappropriately for complex 
problems solving, investors’ biases could lead to systematic mental mistakes.  
  These errors of investment performance estimation   are  predictable,  then  exploitable,  by  smarter,  more 
rational decision makers. An example debated in the paper refers to under reaction of   investors  to  information.  This 
late reaction is a direct consequence of an excess of self-confidence in the ability to process and understand new 
information. The individual is anchored in past opinions and is mentally closed to new information that contradicts the 
old set of beliefs. An interesting example of mental   anchoring is price discount posting in a sales interlude: suggested 
price by the producer > retail price > sales price in this period. The gradual exemplification of the three figures, anchors 
mentally the prospective buyer into an opportunity for a great deal. People buy compulsively not because of apparently 
reduced prices but for the reasons that are certain, they have just found an excellent deal. Our wardrobes are a good 
example of that.  
  The paper advances the idea that the investor psychological biases lead to investment performance to tilt to the 
mean in the long run and by following the trend, the financial market population do not enjoy significant sustainable 
benefits.  As a reflection of the behavioral biases and influences, the statistical demonstration supports the conclusion 
that markets do not random walk.   
  The article reviews some psychological concepts relevant and used in the study, in an interdisciplinary effort 
of  understanding  the  correlation  or  causality  between  psychology  and  finance.  The  paper  aims  at  demonstrating 
whether investor psychological biases lead to investment performance to tilt to the mean in the long run. As a reflection 
of  the  behavioral  biases  and  influences,  the  statistical  demonstration  supports  the  conclusion  that  markets  do  not 
random walk.  By following the trend, the financial market populations do not enjoy significant sustainable benefits. In 
the research reported here investigated the market pattern zigzag to see any predilections or biases or a random walk. 
Analyzing the data for this study leads to the interesting conclusion that individual psychological biases and differences 
should not be confounded with noise within econometric models but rather manifest a solid influential role on the 
dependent variable – investment outcome. Data base source for the article shows that psychological characteristics have 
salient relationships with various aspects of investment decision making process making and the transactional activity 
of the individual investor. The statistical interrogation describes the sampling methodology, the frequency of data and 
the empirical methodology that lead to analysis of the results and concluding remarks. The study provides details on 
raw statistical test scores, regression results and analysis. In this study, I evaluate the association between investors’ 
behavior and her portfolio results. 
The findings suggest that psychological biases can have an impact on risk return optimization, asset allocation 
on investment portfolios and finally on investment outcome. The sources of investor biases that lead to investor finance 
errors the investment management industry can apply the data for the development of products and services (automated 
pilot investing) that may help save investors from sabotaging their financial standing and future prospects. Also, new 
behavioral portfolio construction methods should combine evidently classic finance math with rigorously quantified 
psychological metrics to improve models for operators use in giving financial advice and crate investor portfolios that 
enhance investors chances for reaching their life time financial goals. 
 
The future research 
Students of Behavioral Finance still have much to research on influence of psychological profile dissimilarities 
between  individuals  and  how  these  dissimilarities  manifest  in  real  financial  investment  decision  and  behavior. 
Personality and other individual circumstances and differences systematically influence investment decisions. 
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